Abstract
The climate change game comprises two players each of which generate income by emitting 
t) S(t)
Stock of pollution at time t, a state variable s A realization of S(t) S preindustrial level of carbon ρ(t)
Rate of natural removal of the pollution stock X(t)
Average global temperature, a state variable x A realization of X(t) X long run equilibrium level of carbon temperature B p (t)
Benefits from emissions C p (t)
Damages from pollution π p Flow of net benefits to region p r Discount rate ρ(X, S, t) removal rate of atmospheric carbon σ temperature volatility η(t) speed of mean reversion in temperature equation rising temperature which reduces income. Players seek to maximize their own utility through the optimal choice of per period carbon emissions, balancing the benefits from emissions with 130 the costs that come from rising carbon stocks. And of course, the rate at which carbon stocks 131 increase depends in part on the actions of the other player.
132
For simplicity we assume that there is a one to one relation between emissions and a 133 player's income. The two players are indexed by p = 1, 2 and E p refers to carbon emissions 134 from player p. The stock of atmospheric carbon, denoted by S, is increased by emissions,
135
but is also reduced by a natural cycle depicted by the function ρ(X, S, t) and referred to 136 as the removal rate, where X refers to average global temperature, measured in • C above 137 preindustrial levels and t represents time. As described in Section 4, we will drop the 138 dependence on X and S, and assume that ρ is a function only of time. Carbon stock over 
whereS is the pre-industrial equilibrium level of atmospheric carbon. Equation (1) is stochas-141 tic, in general, since the emission levels E 1 , E 2 , as well as possibly the decay factor ρ are in 142 functions of stochastic state variables.
143
Uncertainty in the evolution of the earth's average temperature is described by an Orn-144 stein Uhlenbeck process:
145 dX(t) = η(t) X (S, t) − X(t) dt + σdZ.
where η(t) represents the speed of mean reversion,X represents the long run mean of global 146 average temperature, σ is the volatility parameter, and dZ is the increment of a Wiener 147 process.
148
The net benefits from carbon emissions for player p, represented by π p are composed of 149 the direct benefits from emissions, B(E p , t) and the damages from increasing temperature 150 due to a growing carbon stock, C p (X, t):
Benefits are specified in Equation (4) as a quadratic function of emissions, which is a common 152 assumption in the pollution game literature,
where a is a constant. Costs of damages from climate change are specified in Equation (5) 154
as an exponential function of temperatur,.
155
C p (t) = κ 1 e κ 3 X(t)
where κ 2 and κ 3 are constants.
156
It is assumed that the control (choice of emissions) is adjusted at fixed decision times 
In this paper we will consider five possibilities for selection of the controls (e and Nash-if-possible (NIP). We delay the precise specification of how these controls are 166 determined until Section 3.2.
167
For any control strategy, the value function for player p, V p (e 1 , e 2 , x, s, t) is defined as:
168
V p (e 1 , e 2 , x, s, t) = E K T t =t e −rt π p (E 1 (t ), E 2 (t ), X(t ), S(t )) dt
+e −r(T −t) V (E 1 (T ), E 2 (T ),X(T ), S(T ), T ) E 1 (t) = e 1 , E 2 (t) = e 2 , X(t) = x, S(t) = s , where E K [·] is the expectation under control set K. As per convention, lower case letters 169 e 1 , e 2 , x, s are used to denote realizations of the state variables E 1 , E 2 , X, S. The value in the 170 final time period, T , is assumed to be the present value of a perpetual stream of expected 171 net benefits at a given carbon stock, S(T ), and the long run mean temperature associated
172
with that carbon stock level,X(S(T ), T ), with chosen level of emissions. This is reflected in 173 the term V (E 1 (T ), E 2 (T ),X(T ), S(T ), T 
3.1 Advancing the solution from t
The solution proceeds going backward in time from t
operator, L for player p, in Equation (10). The arguments in the V p function have been 186 suppressed when there is no ambiguity.
where r is the discount rate. Consider at time interval h < (t m+1 −t m ). For t ∈ (t
the dynamic programming principle states that (for small h),
189
V (e 1 , e 2 , s,
S(t) = s, X(t) = x, E 1 (t) = e 1 , E 2 (t) = e 2 + π p (e 1 , e 2 , s, x, t)h
Letting h → 0 and using Ito's Lemma, 1 the equation satisfied by the value function, V p is 190 expressed as:
The domain of Equation (12) is (e 1 , e 2 , x, s, t) ∈ Ω ∞ , where climate change problem, and are given in Section 4.
196
Remark 1 (Admissible sets Z 1 , Z 2 ). We will assume in the following that Z 1 , Z 2 are compact 197 discrete sets, which would be the only realistic situation.
198
1 Dixit & Pindyck (1994) provide an introductory treatment of optimal decisions under uncertainty characterized by an Ito process such as Equation (2). A more advanced treatment in a finance context is given by Bjork (2009).
s → s min ; No boundary condition needed, outgoing characteristics (13d)
The boundary at t = T gives the terminal value as the the present value of an infinite stream
200
of benefits given the long run mean temperature,X, associated with the particular carbon 201 stock and chosen emissions levels. As is described in Section 4. 
Equation (14) Similarly, we define the best response set of player 1.
242
Definition 2 (Response set of player 1). The best response set of player 1, R 1 (ω 2 ; e 1 ; s, x, t m )
243
is defined to be the best response of player 1 to a control ω 2 of player 2.
244
R 1 (ω 2 ; e 1 ; s, x, t m ) = argmax
Ties are broken as in Remark 2. Again, to avoid notational clutter, we will fix (e 1 , e 2 , s, x, t m )
245
so that we can usually write without ambiguity R 1 (ω 2 ; e 1 ) = R 1 (ω 2 ; e 1 ; s, x, t m ) and R 2 (ω 1 ; e 2 ) =
246
R 2 (ω 1 ; e 2 ; s, x, t m ).
247
Definition 3 (Stackelberg Game: Player 1 first). The optimal controls (e = argmax
break ties e The functional forms and parameter values used in this paper are the same as in Insley, Forcings at CO2 doubling (25) 3.681
Parameters from forcing Equation (25) 0.5
Ratio of the deep ocean to surface temp, 0.008, 0.0021 The evolution of the carbon stock is described in Equation (1). In our numerical example,
290
we use a simplified specification of the path of carbon stock, based on Traeger (2014 Equation (2) specifies the stochastic differential equation which describes temperature, X(t),
304
based on the parameters η(t) andX(t). To relate Equation (2) to the climate change 305 literature, we define these parameters as follows:
. where φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 and σ are constants. 3 According to the Global Carbon Project, 2014 global atmospheric CO2 concentration was 397.15 ± 0.10 ppm on average over 2014. At 2.21 Gt carbon per 1 ppm CO2, this amounts to 840 Gt carbon.(www.globalcarbonproject.org) 4 φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 are denoted as ξ 1 , ξ 2 , and ξ 3 in Nordhaus (2013).
φ 4 indicates the forcing from doubling atmospheric carbon. 5 F EX (t) is forcing from causes 309 other than carbon and is modelled as an exogenous function of time as specified in Lemoine
310
& Traeger (2014) as follows:
Substituting the definitions of η andX into Equation (2) and rearranging gives
The drift term in Equation (27) is a simplified version of temperature models typical in
313
Integrated Assessment Models, based on Lemoine & Traeger (2014) . α(t) represents the 314 ratio of the deep ocean temperature to the mean surface temperature and, for simplicity, is 315 specified as a deterministic function of time.
The values for the parameters in Equation (27) are taken from the DICE (2016) model.
317
Note that φ 1 = 0.02 which is the value reported in Dice (2016) divided by five to convert 
Benefits and Damages

322
Benefits are given as a quadratic function of emissions in Equation (4). In the numerical ex-323 ample, there are four possible emissions levels for each player E p ∈ {0, 3, 7, 10} in gigatonnes
324
(Gt) of carbon and we set a 1 = a 2 = 10 in Equation (4).
325
5 φ 4 translates to Nordhaus's η (Nordhaus & Sztorc 2013). 6 We are able to get a good match to the DICE2016 results using a simple linear function of time.
values for κ 2 and κ 3 are given in Table 2 temperature, which depends on the the carbon stock as well as a random component. Figure   349 1(a) plots utility versus carbon stock for a temperature of 1 • C, and for fixed state variables e 1 and e 2 both set at 10 Gt. Again, a similar pattern emerges for plots with the stock of carbon set at different utilities,
362
but to reduce clutter we show these graphs only for S = 800. at mid carbon stock levels, which as noted early indicates the utility at these two control 409 levels is nearly identical.
410
We conclude that when players are symmetric, over some levels of the state variables
411
(lower levels for carbon stock and temperature), it is worthwhile for Player 2 (the Stackelberg game, the Trump game, the Interleaved game (e 1 = e 2 = 10 Gt), and the Social Planner. This difference depends on the stock of carbon. At S = 1400 and X = 1 • C, total utility in the interleaved game is higher by 5 percent compared to the base Stackelberg game. However for very high carbon stock levels (S = 2200) the difference goes to zero. delay between decisions reduces the tragedy of the commons and increases utility, but with a longer delay this beneficial effect is overwhelmed by the negative effects of not being able 457 to respond promptly to changes in the key state variables, temperature and carbon stock. 
503
In the current paper we consider three alternative specifications of the games, which we call 504 the Trump game, the Interleaved game, and Nash-if-Possible (NIP). These variations provide 505 some interesting insights into the climate change game.
506
In the Trump game, both players act as leaders, mistakenly assuming the other player 507 will respond rationally as a follower. Not surprisingly, total utility is lower in this game.
508
However it is Player 1 (the leader in the Stackelberg base game) who suffers the most. At in utility. We conclude that in the Stackelberg game the follower might as well play like a 513 leader, as she will be no worse off and may be better off at lower levels of the carbon stock.
514
However the Trump game is not beneficial for the environment as total utility or welfare 515 suffers in this game, particularly at higher carbon stock levels.
516
In the Interleaved game, unlike the Stackelberg game, Player 2 does not make a decision 517 immediately after Player 1 makes her choice. Rather there is a gap of several years between 518 player decisions. This element is intended to add some reality to the game, in that policy 519 changes to reduce emissions do not happen instantaneously in the real world. We prove that 520 in the limit as the time interval between player decisions goes to zero, the Interleaved game 521 converges to the Stackelberg game.
522
We examined an Interleaved game of two years with a decision made by one of the players 523 every two years, implying each player must wait four years between their own decisions. In 524 this Interleaved game, we found that total utility increased compared to the basic Stack-525 elberg game in which both players make optimal choices at two year intervals, with the 526 follower choosing instantaneously after the leader. We found the follower does better in this at high emissions levels, the leader is worse of in this Interleaved game. We interpret this 531 result to mean that there is a benefit to a player in not reacting immediately to the actions 532 of the other player. The follower, in particular, benefits from the fact that follower emis-533 sions cannot be changed for two years, forcing the leader to undertake any needed emissions 534 reduction. If the follower starts with a high level of emissions, the leader is forced to react.
535
The relative benefits of the Interleaved game depend on the time interval between deci-536 sions. If the time between decisions is increased, eventually both players will be worse off 537 in the Interleaved game as the extended wait between decisions does not allow the players 538 to adequately respond to the environmental problem. We found this to be the case with an
539
Interleaved game of four years, when individual player make decisions every eight years.
540
In the NIP game, we found that for lower levels of carbon stock and temperature, total 541 utility is increased compared to the base Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg follower is the 542 main beneficiary when both players choose a Nash equilibrium if it exists.
543
The Stackelberg game is convenient to apply in a differential pollution game setting, since 544 a solution can always be found, even if optimal choices at any given time period may not be 545 Nash. However the Stackelberg game may not be the most appropriate for the analysis of 546 strategic decisions in certain settings. We have demonstrated three alternative games which 547 result in improved welfare for one or both players, implying that if given the choice the 548 players would rather be part of these alternative games. A key conclusion of our analysis is 549 that the timing between leader and follower decisions has a crucial impact on the outcome of 550 the game for the players, as well as for total welfare. Another interesting take-away is that 551 the differences between the various games in terms of utility and optimal choices diminishes 552 as temperature and/or carbon stock gets very high. The interpretation here is that when 553 the consequences of excessive carbon emissions become dire, player strategy is no longer 554 important as little can be done to change the outcome for any individual player. p (e 1 , e 2 , x i , s, τ ) = V p (e 1 , e 2 , x i , s, T − τ )
We rewrite Equation (12) in terms of backwards time
Defining the Lagrangian derivative
then Equation (29) becomes
Integrating Equation (32) from τ to τ − ∆τ gives
time τ . We use a fully implicit method as described in Chen & Forsyth (2007) .
566V
p (e 1 , e 2 , x, s τ , τ ) = (∆τ )LV p (e 1 , e 2 , x, s τ , τ )
+(∆τ )π p (e 1 , e 2 , x, s τ , τ ) +V p (e 1 , e 2 , x, s τ −∆τ , τ − ∆τ )
. (34) Equation (34) p (e 1 , e 2 , x, s τ −∆τ , τ − ∆τ ). We discretize in the x direction using an unequally spaced grid
571
with n x nodes and in the S direction using n s nodes. Between the time interval t
use n τ equally spaced time steps. We use a coarse grid with (n τ , n x , n s ) = (2, 27, 21). We We model the possible emission levels as four discrete states for each of e 1 , e 2 , which gives 16 577 possible combinations of (e 1 , e 2 ). We then determine the optimal controls using the methods 578 described in Section 3.2.1. We use exhaustive search (among the finite number of possible 579 states for (e 1 , e 2 ) ) to determine the optimal policies. This is, of course, guaranteed to obtain 580 the optimal solution. Recall that since we use a tie-breaking rule, the optimal controls are 581 unique. cases.
582
B Monotonicity of the Numerical Solution
592
We remind the reader that since we solve the PDEs backwards in time, it is convenient 593 to use the definitions
Assuming that we discretize Equation (34) on a finite difference grid x i , i = 1, . . . , n x , we
Using the methods in Forsyth & Labahn (2007 /2008 , we discretize Equation (34) using the 597 definitions (36) as follows
for i = 1, . . . , n x . Note that the boundary conditions used (see Section 3.1) imply that α 1 = 0
599
and that β nx = 0, so that Equation (37) 
Assume that
which then implies that
If Equation (40) holds, then we should have that V 606
. . , n x − 1. Writing Equation (37) at node i and node
607
i + 1 and subtracting, we obtain the following Equation satisfied by U i , 
where Theorem 1. A sufficient condition for a square matrix Q to be a non-singular M matrix is 616 that (i) Q has non-positive off-diagonal elements (ii) Q is strictly row diagonally dominant.
617
From Theorem 1, and Equation (43), a sufficient condition for Q to be an M matrix is that
which for a fixed temperature grid, can be satisfied for a sufficiently small ∆τ .
then we can assume that
and hence condition (44) is essentially a condition on ∆τ /∆x. In practice, for smoothly 622 varying coefficients, |α i+1 − α i | and |β i − β i+1 | are normally small, so the timestep condition
623
(44) is quite mild.
624
Proposition 1 (Monotonicity result). Suppose that (i) condition (44) is satisfied and (ii)
Proof. From condition (44), Definition 4, and Theorem 1 we have that Q −1 ≥ 0, hence from 627 Equation (42)
629
The practical implication of this result is that if conditions (39) hold at τ = T − t 
The following proposition is proven in Insley, Snoddon & Forsyth (2018).
640
Proposition 2 (Sufficient condition for a Nash Equilibrium). Suppose (ê 
643
Remark 3 (Checking for a Nash equilibrium). A necessary and sufficient condition for a 644 Nash Equilibrium is given by condition (47). However a sufficient condition for a Nash 645 equilibrium in the Stackelberg game is that optimal control of either player is independent of 646 who goes first.
647
D Interleave Game
648
In this appendix, we consider the situation where each player makes optimal decisions alter-649 natively. These decision times are separated by a finite time interval.
650
Suppose that player one chooses an optimal control at time t m , which we denote by e m+ 1 . 
We remind the reader that we break ties by staying at the current level (if that is a maxima of 657 equation (51) ) or preferring the lowest emission level (if the current state is not a maxima).
658
Consequently, e 
660
At time t m+1 , player two chooses a control, with player one's control fixed at e
Player two's control is determined from harmless) set to their maximum level, and temperature remaining at the long run mean.
691
This is an arbitrary assumption. The logic is that even with a technological breakthrough 692 the earth will be left to bear the consequences of past carbon emissions for a long time to 693 come. As a check on the results we ran cases with T = 25 and T = 300. impact on the final stock of carbon, and hence the terminal value of the temperature.
699
Optimal emissions for T = 300 versus T = 150 were also compared. These two cases are 700 very similar, indicating that utility beyond 150 years is not having a large impact on results. 
